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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS 
ANIMALS-KNOWLEDGI': OF VICIOUS PROPSNSITY-0WN$ NOT LIAllLS FOR 
Doc UPS:i::T'l'ING FoRD.-The defendant's dog hacil been in the habit of follow-
ing and barking at automobiles, and this fact was known to the defendant. 
The plaintiff was riding with her husband in a Ford c.-ar, when suddenly the 
defendant's dog jumped in front of them. By running over the dog, the 
car was thrown against an embankment and the plaintiff was injured. Held, 
that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, there being no evidence of a 
vicious propensity in the dog. Melicker v. Sedlacek (Iowa, 1920), 179 N. 
w. 197. : 
In general, the owner is not liable for injury inflicted by his domestic 
animal unless he can be charged with knowledge of a vicious propensity 
which contributed to the injury. Masoti v. Keeling, I Ld. Raym. 6o6; 
Fritsche v. Clemow, 109 Ill. Ap. "335· A dog will not make its master liable 
by knocking a person down, where it is not shoWib that the dog had a pro-
pensity for so doing. Forsythe v. Kluckhohn, 150 Iowa, 126. · Likewise, the 
owner of a turkey is not liable for its frightening a horse. Zumstein v. 
Schnm1m, 22 Ont. App. Rep. 263. Nor is the owner liable for his dog jump-
ing over a fence and landing on the neck of the plaintiff, for the same rea-
son. Sanders v. Teape, 51 L. T. N. S. 263. Neither is there any liaoility 
resulting from a chicken flying into' the spokes of a bicycle and upsetting 
the rider. Hadwell v. Righton [1907], 2 K. B. 345. Nor from a sow fright-
ening a horse so that the driver of an automobile coming from the opposite 
direction had to drive into a stone wall in order to avoid hitting the hors.e. 
Higgins v. Searle, 25 T. L. R. 301. Undoubtedly, the principal case· was cor-
rectly decided, for there was no evidence that the defendant's dog liad a 
vicious propensity for jumping under Fords and causing them to leave th~ 
road, to the discomfort of their occupants. 
CoMMJ>RC:£-0IL lNSPSCTION LAw WITH FEES LARG~Y Exca»mG CosT 
INVALID AS TO lN'l'$S'l'ATI': COMMJ?RCE.-An oil inspection statute in the· state 
of Georgia was attacked on the ground that for a number 9f years the 
amount of the fees fixed by the law had proved to be largely in excess of 
the actual cost of the inspection. Held, that the statute was unconstitutional 
and void as to interstate commerce. Te:ras Co. v. Brown (D. C., N. D., 
Georgia, 1920). 266 Fed. 577. · 
In the exercise of its police power a state may enact inspection laws 
which are valid if they tend in a direct and substantial manner to promote 
the public safety and welfare, or to protect the public from fraud and impo-
sition whr.n dealinp: in articles of general use, as to .which Congress has not 
made any conflicting regulation, and a fee reasonably sufficient to pay the 
cost of such inspection may constitutionally be charged, even though the 
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property may be moving in interstate commerce when inspected. P11re Oil 
Co. v. Minnesota, 248 U. S. 158; Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina· 
Board of Agriculture, 191 U. S. 345; McLean & Co. v. Rio Grande R. R. 
Co., 203 U.S. 38; Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251. But when such inspection 
charge is obviously and largely in excess· of the cost of inspection the act 
will be declared void as constituting in its operation an obstruction to and 
a burden upon that commerce among the states, the exclusive regulation of 
which is committed to Congress by the Constitution. Foote & Co. v. Mary-
land, 232 U. S. 494; Pure Oil Co. v. Minn., supra. The court in passing 
upon a law of this sort is confronted with the difficulty of determining 
whether the measure in question is a bona fide inspection law or a veiled 
revenue measure. Obviously, laws of the latter type may be divided into 
two classes. In the one are those laws whose invalidity necessarily appears 
at first glance, as where it is provided that a certain percentage of the pro-
ceeds is to be turned over to the state treasurer as part of the general fund, 
or that the expense incurred in carrying out the provisions of the act is to 
be paid out of a limited portion of the total receipts only and no further 
provision is made from the general fund. See Caldwell v. State, 119 N. E. 
999; and Wofford Oil Co. v. Smith, 263 Fed. 396. This situation presents 
no difficulty and the court can say immediately that the act is unconstitu-
tional and enjoin its execution. Where, as in the principal case, however, 
the law is valid upon its face, subject only to the objection that the amount 
to be collected will prove excessive, the situation is somewhat different. It 
seems to be well settled that the court will not declare a statute of this type 
invalid in the first instance, since to do so would be to hold the legislature 
guilty of bad faith, and the presumption is that if the fees prove excessive 
in practice the legislature will reduce them. Red "C" Oil Mfg. Co. v. Board 
of Agriculture, 222 U. S. 393. When the facts clearly show, however, that 
the e;x:cessive charge has been continued over a period of years, the court 
is forced to conclude that the act was intended as a revenue measure, under 
the guise of an inspection law, and to declare it void accordingly. Foote & 
Co. v. Maryla1f-d, supra; Standard Oil Co. v. Graves, 249 U. S. 389; Castle 
v. Mason, 91 Ohio St. 266. A more striking situation results when the act 
also provides for non-inspection· duties and evidently contemplates that the 
added expense will be borne by inspection fees. Upon its face a law of 
this sort is within the first class, but at least in cases where there is a pro-
vision for appropriation from the general fund, in case the amount derived 
from the fees proves insufficient for the total expense, the court will place 
it in the second class and refuse to declare it void in the first instance, on 
the ground that inasmuch as there is a possibility that experience may show 
that the proceeds are insufficient for both purposes, and since the presump-
tion is that the fees will be used lawfully if it is in any way possible, the act 
may prove valid in practice. Foote & Co. v. Maryland, supra; American 
C9al,Mining Co. v. The Special Coal and Food Comtnission of Indiana el al. 
(D. C., Dist. of Indiana, Sept. 6, 1920), - Fed.-. 
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CoK:W::ERcr:-RouNDHOUSI; LABoRn lNJU~D WHII.'S DUMPING ASHl;S llROM 
ENGINJ; Hi>LD NO'l' ENGAGJ;D IN INT:ERSTA'l'S Crou.1~-Plaintiff was a laborer 
in a roundhouse. He was injured while removing ashes from an engine 
which had recently come in carrying interstate freight. Tlie next trip of 
the engine was not known, as it hauled both interstate and intrastate trains 
and was not under orders. In an action under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law for injuries, the defendant contended that the plaintiff was engaged 
in interstate commerce. Held, the plaintiff was not engaged in interstate 
commerce. Boals v. Pe1insylvania R. Co. (1920), 183 N. Y. Sup. 915. 
The test as to whether one is engaged in interstate commerce seems to 
be: was the employee at the time of the in1ury directly engaged in interstate 
transportation or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a pa.rt 
of it? Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Hansford, 173 Ky. 126. When the work is 
done directly on the tracks, bridges, or roadbed of an interstate railroad, it 
is uniformly held that the employee is engaged in interstate transportation, 
and the situation is not altered by its use as an intrastate railroad at the 
same time. Pederson v. Delaware, etc .. R. Co., 229 U. S. 146. .Where the 
work done is on· an engine, car, or other rolling stock, an employee is not 
engaged inc interstate commerce unless the instrument under repair is desig-
nated positively for use in interstate commerce. Narey v. Minneapolis, etc., 
R. Co., 177 Ia. 6o6. Its character as an instrument of commerce depends 
upon its employment at the time, not upon remote probabilities or upon 
accidental later events. Ma~•er v. Union R. Co., 256 Pa. St. 474 When the 
workman is not directly engaged on ·an instrument of interstate commerce, 
but his work is more remotely connected with it, the problem becomes m'>re 
difficult. Such work as is so closely reiated to interstate commerce as to be 
in practice and legal contemplation a part of it is interstate transportation. 
A guard at a l:ailroad crossing, a workman leaving his work on an inter-
state railroad, a brakeman on an intrastate car disconnecting an interst:l.te 
car from it, have all been- held to be engaged in interstate transportation. 
Pederson v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 229 U. S. 146; Erie RailrC'ad Co. v. fVir.-
field, 244 U. $. 170; New York Central, etc., R. Co. v. Carr, 238 U. S. 200. 
A workman on a railroad which has not yet become an instrumentality of 
commerce, an employee tearing down a roundhouse rendered useless by 
fire, a person taking down fixtures in an interstate roundhouse, have been 
held not to be enga~ed in interstate transportation. Jackson v. Chicago, etc., 
Ry. Co., 210 Fed. 234; Thomas v. Boston & M. R., 218 Fed. 143; Sl;anks v. 
Delawarr, 11/c., R Co., 23.9 U. S. ~!'6. See Ann. Cases, 1918B, 52. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-Dtr.llGATJON oF LtGrsLA'l'l~'E PowllR.-A statute 
empowered the state fire marshal, and other named officers, whenever they 
should find any building or other structure which, for want of repair, or by 
reason of age or dilapidated condition, or for any cause, was especially 
liable to fire, and which was so situated as to endanger other property or 
persons, to order the same remedied or removed at once. It also provided 
that a property owner, who felt he was aggrieved by the order, could appeal 
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to 1he state fire marshal, who would investigate the matter, but unless he 
revoked the order it should be complied with. Failure to comply with the 
order was made punishable by a fine; such penalty to be sued for in a jus-
tice of peace court or a court of record, with right of appeal. Held, the 
statute is unc·onstitutional as being a delegation of legislative power to the 
state fire marshal. People e:& rel. Gamber v. Sholcm (Ill., 1920), 128 N. 
E. 377. 
The majority of the court rest their decision on the ground that the 
statute lays down no rule by which the fire marshal is to determine when a 
building is especially liable to fire. \Vpat is "proper repair," what shall con-
stitute "age and dilapidated condition," are wholly within the discretion of 
the fire marshal. He is given arbitrary power to determine these matters 
Wi!hout rule er limitation by which such determination shall be reached, 
except that such building shall be especiaily liable to fire. As the decision 
of the fire marshal is final, the property rights of the individual citizens may 
be taken away without just compensation or due process of law, as required 
bY. the constitution. Three judges dissented on the ground that the statute 
did not confer upon the fire marshal arbitrary authority to determine when 
a building was especially liable to fire. They hold that the provision· in the 
statntt which requires that the penalty can be enforced only by a suit before 
a justice of the peace or in a court of record gives the property owner the 
right to appear and contest the decision of the fire marshal. It would seem 
that the decision of the case must be determined by the construction of this 
part of the statute. If, under the statute, an aggrieved property owner 
cannot, whell' sued for the penalty, contest the decision of the fire marshal, 
then the decision of the majority is correct. However, it seems to the writer 
that the minority view is better, and that, in a suit for the penalty, the 
property owner can contest the fire marshal's decision. Unless he has this 
right, the suit in such court can have no real value. The statute gave the 
right of appeal from the judgment of the trial court. That right can mean 
nothing if the only proceeding in ·!he trial court is the formal entering of 
judgment against the property owner for the amount of the penalty. It is 
not unreasonable to suppose that the legislature intended that a property 
owner should, in a suit for the penalty, have the right to contest the decision 
of the fire marshal. and it is 1he duty of courts, in passing on the co:r.sti-
tutionality of a statute, to give it such construction as wiII sustain it rather 
than qnc which will destroy it. It is difficult to define the line which sep-
arates legislative power to make laws from administrative power to make 
regulations. It seems obvious that the legislature could not define in detail 
the exact conditions, which un<ler the different circumstances of location, 
construction, condition, use, and for lack of repair, or by reason of age or 
dilapidated condition. All the legislature can do is to define them in. gen-
eral terms, and leave the determination of the fact to some administrative 
official. In U11io1i Bridge Co. v. U. S., 204 U. S. 364, the constitutionality 
of an Act of Congress was upheld, which declared that navigation should 
be freed from unreasonable obstructions arising from bridges of insufficient 
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height, width and span, or other defects, and which, after declaring this 
general rule, imposed upon the Secretary of War the duty of ascertaining 
what particular cases came within the rule prescribed by Congress, as well 
as the duty of enforcing the rule. To deny to Congress the authority to 
delegate to the executive branch of government the exercise in specific 
instances of a discretionary power, which from the nature of 1:hc case Con-
gress could not itself exercise, would be, the courts say, "to stop the wheels 
of conduct of public business." In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, n8 U. S. 356, an 
ordinance forbade any person to carry on a laundry within the city without 
the consent of the board of supervisors, except in buildings of brick or 
stone. Plaintiff, a native of China, who had complied with all the existing 
regulations for the prevention of fire, was refused such consent by the 
board, upon his application. The ordinance was held unconstitutional, as it 
conferred upon the board arbitrary power, at its own will, to give or with-
hold consent as to persons or places, without regard to the competency of 
the persons applying or ·the propriety of the place selected for carrying on 
the business. This case, however, is distinguishable from the principal case. 
In Yick W o v. H opkfos, supra, there was an arbitrary power in the board 
to grant or refuse consent, and not a conferring of a discretion to be exer-
cised upon a consideration of the circumstances of each case. In the prin-
cipal case, the rule of public policy, which is the essence of legislative action, 
had been determined by the legislature. · What was left to the fire marshal 
was not the determination of what public policy demanded, but simply the 
ascertainment of what the facts in each case required to be done, according 
to the terms of the law. In England Parliament may confer upon adminis-
trative boards the power to arbitrarily decide, without }\indrance from the 
courts, what method of application· an Act of Parliament is to have. Local 
Govt Board v. Arlidge [I9I5], A. C. 120. See also the article in 32 HARV. 
L. Rtv. 447. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MAKING STAT£ MtDICAI. ASSOCIATION THg STATE 
BoARD oF HJ>AI.TH, WITHIN TH£ Pown oF TH~ L~ISLATUm;.-An act of the 
Alabama legislature making the State Medical Association the State Board 
of Health was attacked upon the ground that it was beyond the power of 
the legislature to confer the authority given upon a purely private corpora-
tion. Held, that the act was valid. Parke v. Bradle)• ·(Ala., 1920), 86 So. 28. 
The court otook the view that by virtue of the act the admittedly private 
association became a public board, and that the powers delegated were con-
ferred upon the latter organization, and not upon the Medical Association 
as such. There was no dispute as to the power of the legislature to pass 
health measures and to create a board with administrative functions to car1y 
out its regulations. The position of the court therefore seems conclusive 
as to the principal objection made to the act. A further objection was 
raised, however, conceding this view of the effect of the act was correct, 
that the members of the board· so designated: were in effect necessarily 
selected by members of the State Medical Association acting in their private 
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capacities, governed only by the rules of the association, and responsible 
neither to the state nor to the people. This raises what seems to be the 
real question involved in the case, namely. whether or not a legislature can 
delegate to a private corporation or association the power to appoint mem-
bers of a public board where the members of the private organization pos-
sess some special skill and training which peculiarly fits them to select 
proper incumbmts for the offices. In the principal case this question is indi-
rectly presented, and the court is able to make the somewhat metaphysical 
counter that the individuals so selected become members of the association 
only, and that their subsequent transition to the public board results not 
from the election but from the designation of the association as the state 
board. The ccurt is not content to rest upon this somewhat dubious ground, 
however, but proceeds to review the authorities which have considered the 
proposition directly and have held that such a delegation of the power to 
appoint is valid. The following cases have held acts valid providing for the 
appointment of medical examiners or members of state boards of health 
by private corporations or associations: Scholle v. State, 9Cl Md. 729; E:r 
parte Gerina, 143 Cal. 412; Brooks v. State, 88 Ala. 122; Ex parte Frazer, 54 
Cal. 94- Acts delegating the appoin,!ment of state dental examiners to dental 
associations have also been su:;tained. Wilkins v. State, n3 Ind. 514; Over-
.~hillcr v. State, 156 Ind. 187. In Bullock v. Billheimer, 175 Ind. 428, it was 
held that the appointment of members of the advisory committee of the 
, agricultural station could be delegated to various incorporated agricultural 
societies. In Ex parte McManus, 151 Cal. 331, an act of the legislature pro-
\vided for a state board bf architecture, the members of which were to be 
chosen by the governor from two associations of architects. There the 
question of the validity of a delegation of the appointive power was involved 
only indirectly. Nevertheless, the court upheld the general principle that 
this power may be giveD to private institutions. In the ordinary state con-
stitution there is no direct inhibition against such legislative action. Fre-
quent objections to such legislation have been that it confers special privi-
leges upon a limited class, and that in the case of corporations it confers 
corporate powers by special act, contrary to the usual constitutional pro-
. vision prohibiting this. It has been held not to be a special privilege within. 
the constitutional restriction because it is not exercised for the benefit of 
the particular indiyiduals but for the general public. E:r: parte Gerina, ."1lPra; _ 
Ex parte Frazer, supra. It has als9 been held not to be a corporate power. 
Ex parte_ Gerina, supra; Ex parte Frazer, supra; Overshiner v. State, supra. 
In almost all of the cases involving the point courts have stressed the prac-
tical value of having the members of such boards selected by skilled bodies 
haying a per,uliar interest in the successful administration of the Jaw. This 
consideration seems to provide an adequate safeguard for a practice which 
might easily become somewhat dangerous. Judging from the comparatively 
few cases the practice of delegating ~uch appointive power is still in its 
early stages of development, but it is worthy of note that in most of the 
cases cited the institutions attacked had long been in existence. In the prin-
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cipal case the association had acted as the state board· of health in accordance 
with the act for forty-five years without question. 
CoNTRACTs-CoMMUNICA'l'ION oF OFI!"SR-MIS'l'AKE IN TuLF.GRAM.-Butler 
wired an offer to buy 50 shares of stock, the telegram concluding, "Wire 
confirmation." Foley wired acceptance as to 44 shares. Butler wired con-
firmation of the 44- Foley, defendant, failed to deliver. He based his 
defe11se on the fact that the telegraph company left the word "subject" out 
of his telegram by mistake, and that, since Butler asked for an answer by 
wire, he made the telegraph company his agent and took the risk of mistake. 
Held, Foley's counter proposition was an offer, of which Butler's second 
message was an acceptance, and as the offerer makes the telegraph company 
his agent, Foley took the risk of mistake and is responsible on the contract. 
Butler v. Foley (Mich., I!)20), I79 N. W. 34. 
Ayer v. Western Un.ion Tel. Co., 79 Me. 493; Western Union Tel. Co. v. 
Shatter, 7I Ga. 76o, and Sherrerd v. Western Union Telegraph Co., I46 Wis. 
I97, are strong authorities for the doctrine that if the -offerer communicates 
his offer by telegram he makes the .telegraph company his agent, and is 
bound by the offeree's acceptance of the offer as delivered, providing -the 
offeree h3d no reascnable grounds for knowing there was a mistake. An 
extreme application of the doctrine is seen in Price Brokerage Co. v. C., B. 
& Q. R.R. Co. (Mo., I9I7), I99 S. W. 732, where the mistake changed the 
the price of potatoes from $I.~5 to .35 per cwt., there being no potatoes on 
the market at anything like the latter figure, yet the court held the sender 
of the telegram bound by the contract. See, however, Germain Fruit Co. v. 
Western Union Tel. Co., I37 Cal. 5g8. In Durkee v. Vermont Central R.R. 
Co., 29 Vt. I27, and Magi.- v. Herman, 50 Minn. 424. both cited and relied 
upon in the principal case, the question being which copy of the message 
was primary evidence, it is said' that the one who first uses the wire in a 
transaction makes the telegraph company his agent. But the principal case 
must stand on the narrower ground that the offerer makes the telegraph 
company his agent, irrespective of previous messages. The strongest argu-
ment for the above doctrine is to be found in the matter of commercial con-
venience. The cases opposed, which are at least as numerous and' are 
stronger in technical legal reasoning, deny that the telegraph company is the 
agent of the offerer with power to make a different contract from that which 
he intended. If agent at all, it is only a special agent with specific authority 
to deliver that particular message and no other. These cases give the sender 
an action in contract or tort against the telegraph company, and if he is 
injured by the mistake, the sendee also has an action in tort against the 
company, but the sender is not bound by the sendee's acceptance of the 
C'hanged offer. H en!ul v. Pape> L. R. 6 Exch. 7; Strong v. W ester11 Unioii Tel. 
Co., I8 Tclaho 389, 409; Shingleur v. Western Union Tel. Co., 72 Miss. Io30; 
Pepper v. Western Union Tel. Co., 87 Tenn. 554; Postal Tel. & Cable Co. 
v. Schaefer, no Ky. 907; Mount Gilead Cotton Oil Co. v. Western Union 
Tel. Co., I7I N. C. 705. See also I MI~. L. R.iw. 588. Undoubtedly, the 
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principal case is correct in result, but not on the basis of agency. In con-
tracts there is no offer until it enters the consciousness of the offeree, and 
the offer is that which reaches his consciousness, if he interprets reasonably 
and in good faith. Here the erroneous telegram reached the consciousness 
of the offeree, and was therefore the offer, he having no reason to doubt 
the correctness thereof. 
CoRPORATIONS-AUT'.HORITY TO GUARANTEE CoNTRACT OF ANOTHER TO 
WHOM CORPORATION WAS SELLING GOODS IS IMPLIED.-A moving picture pro-
ducing company contracted with D Company for costumes, also with P for 
lumber, •o use in the production of a film. Upon P refusing further credit, 
D Company guaranteed payment of all bills P had or would have against 
the producing company. In a suit on the guaranty, held, contract of guar-
anty is within the implied' powers ·of the company and is not ultra vires. 
Wood's Lumber Co. v. Moore (Cal., 1920), 191 Pac. 905, 
A corporation has implied power to make all contracts which are essen-
tial to the successful prosecution of the business. Bates v. Coronado B. Co., 
109 Cal. 100; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Kiser, 91 Ga. 636. Or such contracts 
as are necessary and helpful to the conduct of its authorized business. Timm 
v. Grand Rapids Br. Co., 16o· Mich. 371; Depot Realty Syndicate v. En-ter-
prise Br. Co., 87 Ore. 560. Or which tend directly to promote the business 
authorized by its articles. Kraft v. BreaJing Co., 219 Ill. 205; Horst v. Lewis, 
71 Neb. 365. If within the above principles, such a contract or guaranty or 
suretyship is not ultra vires. Marbury v. Ke11tucky Union Lond Co., 62 Fed. 
Rep. 335; Wheeler v. Everett Land Co., 14 Wash. 630; Winterfield v. Cream 
City Br. Co., 96 Wis. 239- For other cases see note, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 186. 
Whether a corporation's contract of guaranty is valid or ultra ·vires depends 
then on whether it directly furthers the authorized business or is too remotely 
in promotion of that business. In the following situations, as being a direct 
benefit, the guaranty was held valid: Loan and Trust Co. guaranteeing bonds 
of another corporation, upon sale thereof, Broadway Natl. Bank v. Baker, 
176 Mass. 294; railroad company receiving bonds in payment of debt, sold 
them with guaranty, Rogers Works v. Southern Ry. Assn., 34 Fed Rep. 278; 
sawmill company guaranteeing bonds of railroad company for construction 
of railroad to timber lands of sawmill company, -~f ercantile Trust Co. v. 
Kiser, 91 Ga. 636; land company, with authority to acquire right of way to 
mines, guaranteeing bonds of railroad running co mines in order to secure 
its construction, .Marbury v. Kentucky Union Land Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 335; 
banking company guaranteeing bonds of railroad in which it owns a con-
trolling interest, C"nlrai Railroad Co. v. Fanpers' L. & T. Co., n4 Fed. Rep. 
263; lumber company going surety on bond of contractor to whom it fur-
nishes supplies, Central Lumber Co •. v. Kelter, 201 Ill. 503; W"lieeler v. Everett 
Land Co., 14 Wash. 630; brewing company going surety on license bond of 
customer, Horst v. Lewis, 71 Neb. 365; Timm v. Grand Rapids Br. Co., 16o 
Mich. 371; brewing company guaranteeing rent of customer, Halloran v. 
Jacob Smidt Br. Co., 137 Minn. 141; Depot Realty Sy11dicate v. Enterprise 
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Br. Co., 87 Ore. 56o; brewing company guaranteeing rent of hotel in which 
its beer was to be sold, Winterfield v. Cream City Br. Co., g6 Wis. 239; 
Holm v. Claus Lipsius Br. Co., 21 N. Y. App. Div. 204; brewing company 
guaranteeing purchase price of saloon- in consideration of purchaser selling 
its beer, Hagerstowii Br. Co. v. Gates, n7 Md. 348; a corporation going 
surety on the obligation of another in order to procure payment of a debt 
due it, In re West of E11gland Ba1ik, 14 Ch. Div. 317; Hzss v. W. & I. 
Sloane, 66 N. Y. App. Div. 522; cattle company executing a guaranty to 
protect itself from probable loss of debt due to it, N. Texas State Ba11k v. 
Crowley-Southerland Com. Co. (Tex.), 145 S. W. 1027; same situation as 
in principal case. But the benefit was considered too remote for the guar-
anty to be within the implied powers of the corporation in the following 
situations: Bank guaranteeing paper of third party for which it received 
no benefit, Bomen v. Needles Natl. Bank, 94 Fed. Rep .. 925; brewing c6mpany 
signing appeal bond for customer, Best Br. Ca. v. Klassen, 185 Ill. 37; rail-
road guaranteeing dividends upon stock in steamship company which ran 
to and from terminal of railroad, Colman v. Eastern Counties Railroad Co., 
IO Beav. l; upon stock in grain elevator company, M emph"is Grain & Ele-
vator Co. v. Memphis Railroad Co., 85 Tenn. 703; upon stock in hotel com-
pany, West Maryland R. Co. v. Blue Ridge Hotel Co., 102 Md. 307; land 
company guaranteeing dividends upon stock in investment company, Greene 
v. Middleborough To~ Co., 121 Ky. 335; railroad company guaranteeing 
payment of expenses of a large musical festival fu the city where it does 
business, Davis v. Old. Colony R. Co., 131 Mass. 258. It appears that the 
courts are becoming more lenient, allowing guaranty contracts by a corpora-
tion. If the contract has been performed in good faith and the corporation 
has had the full benefit of performance, it should not be permitted to rely 
on ultra vires as a defense. 
CovtNANTS-TuNANT HEI.D ENTlTLl':D TO ENFOR<$ Cov!lNANT IN·Ll':ASF. BY 
ANOTHER TeNANT.-A landlord leased certain parts of a building to one 
tenant, giving him the right to sell dry goods. He leased another part of 
the building to another tenant with the restriction that he should sell only 
women's gloves, corsets·and hosiery. Upon. a violation of the covenant by 
the second lessee, it was held that the first lessee was entitled to an injunc-
tion against him. (N. Y. 1920) Staff v. Bemis Realty Co. et al., 183 N. Y. 
S. 886, III Misc. Rep. 635. 
The point of interest in this case is that the court, passing by the que~­
tion whether the recording of the plaintiff's lease was not constructive notice 
<to the world of his peculiar rights· and the resultant restriction upon others, 
held that the plaintiff's equity against the defendant was even stronger than 
if the defendant had! had actual notice of the prior lease, because the defend-
ant expressly covenanted to limit his use of the premises. A party's right 
to avail himself of an equitable servitude in his favor has its basis in the 
fact that he has a superior equity to that of the defendant, or else that the 
defendant has no equity at all. Upon principle, it would seem that the 
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defendant in the instant case had actual notice that somebody else had rights 
in the premises with which he could not interfere. He had actual notice 
that if he used the premises for any other purpose than that expressed in 
his lease he would be violating his covenant. What difference could it make 
to him who enforced the covenant against him? In the case of a building 
scheme, for example, any grantee may enforce an equitable restriction against 
any other grantee. Bouvier v. Segardi. (N. Y., 1920), 183 N. Y. S. 814; 
Simpson v. Mikkelsen, 1g6 111. 575 (19o2); Allen v. Detroit, 167 Mich. 464 
(1911); Kom v. Campbell, 192 N. Y. 490 (1go8). These authorities show 
·conclusively that restrictions may be implied, and that a party does not have 
to know who may enforce the covenant against him. The situation in the 
principal case is closely analogous to the building scheme. The defendant 
must have suspected that the entire premises belonging to the landlord were 
being leased under certain restrictions. Indeed, that is usually the situation 
when sucl,i a restriction is put into the grantee's lease. It could make no 
difference to the defendant who could require him to live up to his agree-
ment. He had actual notice of the limits of his rights in regard to the 
premises. Therefore, he has no right to complain that the plaintiff is com-
pelling him to refrain from doing what he has already agreed not to do . 
• 
CRIHINAL LAw-MoroR VEHICLE LAW WHICH MADE Qur.sTro~ ol" UNR£A-
soNABLS SPEED ONE FOB. THE JURY, NOT Vom FOR UNCER'l'AIN'l'Y.-The peti-
tioner was charged with driving his automobile within the city of Pasadeiia 
at a rate of speed in violation of the motor vehicle law, which declared the 
operation of a motor car at an unreasonable speed a crime, and left the 
question of unreasonable for the jury. In an action questioning the validity 
of the statute, held, not invalid for indefiniteness. Ex parte Daniels (Cal., 
1920), 192 Pac. 442. 
In Ex parte Jackson, 45 Ark. 158, it was held that a statute making it a 
misdemeanor to commit any act injurious to public health or public morals 
was void for uncertainty. A statute making it a crime to charge or collect 
more than a reasonable rate of toll was also void. Laws which define crime 
ought to be so explicit that all men subject to their penalties may know 
what acts it is their duty to avoid. Before a man can be punished, his case 
must be plainly and unmistakably within the statute. United States v. 
Brewer, 139 U. S. 280. In James v. Bowman, 190 U. S. 144. the Supreme 
Court said: "It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set 
a net large enough to catch all possible offenders,· and leave it to the courts 
to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained and who should be 
set at large." In Hayes v. State, 11 Ga. App. 3791 the court held that a 
statute making penal the operation of an automobile at a rate of speed 
greatt'r than is reasonable and proper was void on the gr~und that it fur-
nishet such a net as stated above. The Supreme Court of the United States 
invoked the "rule of reason" when °it held that the Anti-Trust Act was not 
a denial of all restraint of trade, but only a denial of unreasonable restr:.iint 
of trade. Standard Oil Case, 221 U. S. I; Tobacco Trust C'!se, 221 U. S. 107. 
RECENT IMPORT ANT DECISIONS 219 
The Ohio court pointed out that it would be impossible to set a rate of speed 
that would be· suitable under ·au conditions, and invoked "the rule of reason" 
in holding valid a statute similar to the one in the principal case. State v. 
Shaefer, II7 N. E. 220. The Nebraska Court in Schult:; v. State, 89 Neb. 34> 
upheld a similar statute. The Texas Court in Sola1i & Billings v. Pasche, 
153 S. W. 672, sa_id by way of dictum that a statute such as was upheld iµ 
the principal case was void for indefiniteness, but held that it was sufficiently 
definite as a remedial statute imposing a civil duty so as to render its vio- · 
lation negligence per se. A statute forbidding the driving of automobiles 
in access of a certain speed "in the business portion" of cities was not void 
for indefiniteness. People v. Dow, 155 Mich. us. See also 18 MICH. L. fuv. 
810, and L R A. 1918 D, 132. 
DEAD BoDn::s-PRormt'tY IN A CoRPss.-The plaintiff's mother was interred 
in a burying ground which had been dedicated to that purpose by the original 
owner. Defendant, without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, acting 
tlirough its employees, disinterred the body, and1 reinterred it at a place 
unknown to the plaintiff. A statute provides that wherever trespass will lie 
an action on the case may be maintained. Held, that trespass would lie for 
such rlisint,.rment, and that title and possession of the burial lot are not nec-
essarily involved in the right sought to be protected. England v. Central 
Pocahontas Coal Co. (W. Va., 1920), 104 S. E. 46. 
Although the reasoning of the court is not altogether clear, it would 
seem that it considers the corpse as the property of the plaintiff, for, in 
holding that trespass would lie, it states specifically that title and possession 
of the lot are immaterial. This case goes much forth.er than the great 
majority of decisions on this subject, for in most of the decided cases the 
courts have refused to recognize the right of property in a corpse. In fact, 
the American courts have been almost unanimous in holding that the right 
in a corpse is in the nature of a "quasi property" right, and nothing more. 
See Keyes v. Konkel, n9 Mich. 550, and cases there cited. The general view 
seems to be that to entitle one to an action of trespass he must have actual 
or constructive possession of the soil where the body is interred. Bessemer 
Land & Improvemmt Co. v. Jenkins, III Ala. 135; Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 
Mass. 281. In Pettigrew v, Pettigrew,·207 Pa. 313, however, the court holds 
distinctly that the widow of the deceased has a property right in the corpse, 
and the same view is taken in .Mines v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., 3 Aiberta 
L. Rep. 408. In Larso1i v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, an action for mutilation of 
the corpse, the court indicates clearly that it considers the corpse as the 
property of the next of kin. The principal case seems to uphold that prop-
osition. 
EASEMENTS-ORAL AGREEMEN'l' TO RF.S'l'RICl'-ENFORctMEN'.L'.-The vendor 
of lots made an oral promise to the vendee that certain building restrictions 
in the latter's deed would be imposed upon the other lots in the area. In a 
suit to enjoin the conveyance of the other lots free from restrictions. held, 
220 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
this was an agreement for the sale of an interest in lands, and void because 
not in writing _as required by the Statute of Frauds. Ham v. Massiot Real 
Estate Co. (R. I., 1919.), 107 Atl. 1205. 
Conceding that such a restriction creates an interest in land, and there 
being no part performance to take the promise out of the statute, it would 
seem difficult to escape the court's conclusion. In Sprague v. Kimball, 213 
Mass. 38o, the court, calling such a restriction an equitable easement, refused 
to grant relief.' Jn Pyper v. Whitman, 32 R. I. 35, the grantor represented 
that all the lots in an area would be laid out according to an unrecorded plat, 
which showed the location of a certain street. In a suit to enjoin the grantor 
from changing the location of such street, the court held that no easement 
had been acquired. See also Norton v. Ritter, 106 N. Y. Supp. 129; Sq1,ire 
v. Campbell, I Myl. & Cr. 459; Gilbert v. Peteler, 38 Barb. 488. On the other 
hand, it has been held that a general building scheme maintained from its 
inception and relied upon by all parties in interest would create a binding 
restriction on all the lots, whether in the hands of the grantor or grantees, 
and whether all the deeds contained the restrictions or not. Allen v. ·City 
of Detroit, 167 Mich. 464; Re Birmingham & Dist. Land Co. [18931, 1 Ch. 
D. 681. Relief has also been granted on the grounds of t>stoppel arising out 
of reliance upon the grantor's promise. Bunson v. Bi1ltman, 38 N. Y. Supp. 
209. In Talmadge v. The East River Bank 26 N. Y. 105, the court contented 
itself by saying that the equity arising from such· representations attached 
to the remaining lots. See also Hiibbell v. Warren, 8 Allen 173; Parker v. 
Nightengale, 6 Allen 341. In most of these cases no legal remedy was avail-
able, as there was neither privity of contract nor privity of estate between 
the parties. This may account for the liberality with which some courts qf 
equity have regarded such oral restrictions. While the cases are not entirely 
in harmony, it may be gathered from the decisions that in the absence of 
fraud or part performance relief will not be granted unless there is expressly 
or by necessary implication an intention on the part of the grantor that the 
restriction shall permanently bind the land retained. Such an intention is 
manifested in cases where lots are sold with reference to a general building 
plan. See note in 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) g62. 
FoRtlGN Exr:cUTORs-Su1Ts BY AND AGAINST FoRI::IGN Exi;curo&s.-Under 
certain conditions a statute authorized foreign executors and administrators 
to sue and be sued. D, a foreign executor, was sued in his representative 
capacity while within the jurisdiction. D moved to set aside the service. 
Held, the court had no jurisdiction and the statute must be construed as 
giving privilege of suing in all cases, but as taking away immunity from 
suit only in those cases where there are local assets, as any other construc-
tion would render that part of the statute unconstitutional. Helme v. Buck-
elew (N. Y., ·1920), 128 N. E. 216. 
In the absence of statute the general rule is that a foreign e.'Cecutor 
cannot sue or be sued in his representative capacity unless there is a res to 
give the· court jurisdiction. lt!jfcrson v. Ball, II] Ala. 436; Greer v. Ferg"-
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son, 56 Ark. 324 Moreover, it cannot be doubted that the state may by 
statute extend the privilege of suing to foreign executors, but whether it 
can destroy the immunity from suit where there are no local assets, and 
without the consent of the state granting the letters, is easily distinguishable 
upon principle. In one case, however, this distinction was ignored• and a 
suit against a foreign executor was sustained. Cady v. Bard, 21 Kan. 667; 
.but the court cites no authorities to sustain its decision. In Thorburn v. 
Gates, 225 Fed. 613, the Federal Court was called upon to construe the same 
statute involved in th_e principal case, and to avoid holding a part of the 
statute unconstitutional limited the operation of that part of the statute 
abridging the immunity of foreign e.xecutors from suit to those cases where 
the law of the state appointing the executor authorized a foreign action. 
In a note to that case in 29 HARV. L. Rr:v. 442, the opinion was asserted that 
this was a strained construction and that a more reasonable interpretation 
would limit the operation of the statute to cases where there were local 
assets. This view is adopted in the principal case. For an exhaustive com-
pilation of authorities on the general subject, see Z1 I,. R. A. 101. 
HEPBURN ACT-COMMODITIES CLAUSE-HOLDING CoMPANY.-A holding 
company acquired all the stock of a coal mining company and all the stoclc 
of the railroad company whose road e.'<:f:ended from the mine fields of the 
coal company to the market. The organization and operation of the holding 
and each subsidiary company was kept entirely separate, but all three had the 
same officers and directors. In an action by the government for. dissolution 
under the act of June 29, 1go6, making it unlawful for any railroad company 
to transport in interstate commerce any commodity prodµced or mined by 
it, or under its authority or in. which it may have an interest direct or indi-
rect, except such commodities as are used by it; held, the coal is mined and 
transported under the same authority in violation of the act. Untted States 
v. Reading Co. (1920), 40 Sup. Ct. 425. 
The decision represents another victory for reality, .in applying the act, 
over the fiction of corporate entity; and puts into discard one more scheme 
to consolidate the ultimate control over production and transportation of a 
commodity and yet not violate the act. In United States v. Delaware & 
H1'dso1i Co., 213 U. S. 366, it was held that the interest, direct or indirect, 
in the commodity was limited to the legal or equitable meaning, and did not 
include articles or commodities produced by a bona fide corporation in which 
the railroad company is a stockholder. But in United States ""· Lehigh Val-
le:;i Railroad Co., 220 U. S. 257, the court held that where the railroad com-
pany owned all the stock of the mining company and reduced it to a mere 
department, the mining company would not be considered bona fide, and the 
act was therefore not avoid_ed by the theory of separate entity. Later a 
railroad company owning mines attempted to circumvent the act by organ-
izing a sales company, the stock of which was issued to the railroad share-
holders- in lieu of dividends. The sales company contracted for the output 
of the mines and became the legal owner of the coal transported over the 
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railroad. But because by the contract the railroad compa~y limited the free-
dom of the sales company in buying coal and in other matters, it was held 
the contract was not bona fide and was merely a means by which the railroad 
though parting with the legal title retained an interest and control in what 
had been sold. United States v. Delaware, Lackawana & Western Railroad 
Co., 238 U. S. 516. See also 14 M·1cH. L. IU:v. 49. In a tater case, Chicago, 
Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic Association, 247 U. S. 
490, in which also the separate entity of a corporation used as a mere agency 
of carriers was held to be of no ,avail, the court declared that statements 
made in former decisions to the effect that ownership alone of capital stock 
in one corporation by another does not create an identity of· interest, cannot 
be relied upon where the ownership is resorted to not for the purpose of 
participating in the affairs of a corporation in the normal and usual manner, 
but to create a mere agency or instrumentality of the owning company. It 
thus appears that the court has adopted by this line of decisions bona fide 
intentions as the touchstone to distinguish the existence or not of separate 
corporate entities. ·And if the railroads do not succeed in devising means 
to sell and also keep their great mining interests so as to satisfy the com-
modities clause of the Interstate Commerce Act, it may be they can do so 
only by a bona fide sale of all mining interests. and limit themselves to carry-
ing. The property involved is very large and the problem is Jlot simple. 
INDIANS-INDIAN Au.oTn:r: AcQUIRSS FULL EQUITABLE Es'l'A'l'E.-An Act 
. of Congress provided that allotments and trust patents be granted ·to Indians 
with a further provision that the whole legal estate would be granted at the 
end of twenty-five years to the allottee or his heirs, and that all such con-
veyances shall be subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, 
and when so approved shall convey a full title to the grantee. Ns grantor, 
who was not the heir of the allottee received a patent approved by the Sec-
retary of the Interior. Held (Gates, J., dissenting), A took no title as against 
the lawful heirs of the allottee. Highrock v. Gavin (S. D., 1920), 179 N. 
w. 12. 
This decision overrules the recent case of Dougherty v. McFarland, 40 
S. D. 1 (1918), decided by the same court, and where it was held that an 
allotment was only a trust not binding on Congress, and that a conveyance 
approved by the Secretary of the Interior operated to convey the whole estate 
in fee simple. In the principal case the majority of the court had changed 
their view as to the legal effect of an allotment under the Act of Congress,_ 
and decided that the allotment conveyed the whole equitable title to the 
allottee, of which he could not be divested without his consent. The char-
acter of the estate of the allottee under different treaties and Acts of Con-
gress has been variously stated by the courts. In Hallowell v. Commons, 
210 Fed. 793, it was said that the full equitable title passed to the Indian 
under a similar provision. In United States v. Chase, 245 U. S. 89, the rela-
tion between the government and allottee was in issue, and the Supreme 
Court decided that an allotment did no more "than to individualize the exist-
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ing tribal right of occupancy." In Fuwlcr v. Scott, 64 Wis. 509, the faets 
and the decision were identical with those of the principal case. However, 
the question involved seems to be no more than the constntction and mean· 
ing of Acts of Congress, and other decisions based upon other treaties or 
Acts of Congress should hardly be controlling. 
INJUNCTION-SALr:SMAN WORKING FOR COMMISSIONS CANNO'l' ENJOIN 
STRix~ or- WORKMEN oF THE CoMPANY EMPLOYING HiM.-In a suit to enjoin 
the striking employees of a buggy company, the plaintiff, a salesman whose 
sole claim of interest was that of possible interference with his commission 
due to the closing down of the corporation's business, was held not to have 
sufficient interest to sue without joining the buggy company, and his bill was 
dismissed. Davis et al. v. Henry (Circuit Court of Appeals, 1920), 2")() Fed. 
261. 
The chief cases which seem to support the contention that a party with 
a special interest may maintain an equity suit to enjoin a strike without join· 
ing the corporation or company affected practically all involve some recog· 
nized property interest. In Fordney v. Carter, 203 Fed. 454. bond-holders 
are allowed to maintain such a suit, while in Es Parle Haggart~·, 124 Fed. 
441, and Jennings v. United States, 264 Fed. 399, the trustees of mortgage 
bonds maintained suits alone to enjoin strikers injuring the corporation, on 
the basis of injuries to their own interests. A similar case is that of the 
stockholder of a corporation who may maintain a suit to protect his own 
interests in a corporation only when the corporation for some reason is not 
able or willing to maintain suit itself. In such a case equity will go behind 
the corporate fiction and recognize that th~ stockholders ~.re the real parties 
in interest and will protect their rights. See MARSHALL'S PRlvA'l'£ CoRPORA· 
'l'IONS, Secs. 299, 30s. Hence, in the event that the stockholder exhausts all 
possibilities in trying to get the corporation. or the majority of the stock· 
holders to sue, his equitable interest in the corporate property will be given 
protection. But the principal case is not a suit based upon an equitable or 
legal interest in the company's property, but is a mere attempt to protect a 
possible interest in the profits of the corporation. If such an interest should 
be protected in equity, this would mean that any employee with a possibility 
of gain or return from the profits of the corporation might enjoin acts that 
endangered that possibility. No court seems ever to have gone to that length. 
INNin:£P.£R-LIAnir.ITY FOR PRoP.£R'l'Y NO'l' Los'l' 'l'HROUGH GU:EsT's Nr:GI.I· 
G£NC£.-The plaintiff, an experienced traveler. entered the defendant's hotel 
and lunched there. The rooms were all occupied. In expectation that a 
room would later be vacated so that he could register, he left his grip near 
the bellboys' bench in the lobby, without calling anybody's attentioi:i to it, 
though there were present attendants to take charge of baggage and though 
he knew the location of an easily accessible checkroom in the lobby. Here 
he could have checked his grip without cost or inconvenience. He then 
departed from the hotel, remaining away for several hours. The grip was 
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
lost. In an action to recover its value, held, plaintiff's conduct did not con-
stitute contributory negligence in law. Swanner v. Conner Hotel Co. (Mo., 
1920), 224 S. W. I23. 
The court in a quotation from Read v. Amidon, 4I Vt. I5 (I868), regard-
ing the care required of a guest for his own goods, says : "~ * * he is bound 
to use reasonable care and prudence in respect to their i;afety, so as not to 
expose them to unnecessary danger or loss." In the Vermont case above, 
the lower court directed judgment for the defendant, and this was reversed 
on the ground that the negligence of the guest was a question for the jury. 
The court in the principal case says, "The Vermont case is quite similar to 
the facts of the instant case,'' but it fails to distinguish between leaving an 
article of clothing: on a bench in a room in an apparently small inn in I865, 
where the proprietor is personally in charge, no other accommodations being 
made for the guest's apparel, and leaving a grip in the lobby of a modern, 
busy hotel for ten hours without informing anyone of the fact, though 
attendants were present to take charge of baggage and though the grip 
was left within twenty feet of an easily accessible free checkroom. The 
cases cited by the court are not in point: In Jitlaloncy v. Bacon, 33 Mo. App. 
50I, the question did not deal with negligence, the court holding a trunk 
"infra hospitium" when delivered: to the place where trunks were ordinarily 
received by the hotel and where customary notice of the delivery was given 
the hotelkeeper. In Labold v. So. Hotel Co., 54 Mo. App. 56i, the· CQUrt held 
it was not negligence for a guest to give his coat to an attendan.t with appar-
ent authority to ~are for the same, instead of putting it in the checkroom. 
The opinion of the dissenting judge represents what would seem the opinion 
of a "reasonable man." It reads: "If the plaintiff's own evidence does not · 
show him guilty of negligence in exposing his hand-grip to peril without 
the slightest excuse for so doing, I do not know what he could have done 
that would be negligence.. Plaintiff has no one to blame for his loss except 
himself and should not be allowed damages." 
INSURANCE-BREACH OF CONDITION-CHATTEL MORTGAGE, Vom FOR USURY, 
SuF.FICIENT To Avom FIRE PoLICY.-Where a fire policy declared that it should 
be void if the property insured should be incumbered by a chattel mortgage, 
and the assured gave such a mortgage, which was, however, void for usury, 
it was held, that the ·mortgage nevertheless avoided the policy. Lipedes v. 
Liverpool & London & Globe 111surance Co. (N. Y., Ig20), I28 N. E. 160. 
The rule that conditions of forfeiture are strictly construed against the 
party in whose favor they tend to operate is especially applicable to insurance 
contracts. Ins. Co. v. Vanlue, I26 Ind. 410; Downey v. Ins. Co., 77 W. Va. 
386; Gilchrist v. Ins. Co., I70 Fed. 279; Baley v. Ins. Co., 8o N. Y. 2I; I 
Coor.E¥'s BRIEFS oF THE LAW oF INSURANCE, 633. Such being the attitude 
of the law, the decision of the principal case is in effect a departure from 
the beaten track of the decisions,a departure which the majority opinion 
justifies on the ground that "the moral hazard is the test by which the terms 
of the policy are to be construed." But an ineffectual incumbrance does not 
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increase the moral risk. Rowland v. Ins. Co., 82 Kan. 220. The minority 
view, which undoubtedly represents the weight of authority, maintains the 
position that the incumbrance must be a valid subsisting lien upon the prop-
erty in order to be such an inrnmbrance as was within the contemplation of 
the parties, and as will effect a forfeiture. Ins. Co. v. Sewing Machine Co., 
41 Mich. 131; Rowland v. Ins. Co., supra; Hanscom v. Ins. Co., 90 Me. 333; 
N eafie v. Woodcock, 44 N. Y. Supp. 768. 
For a note on the effect of a valid chattel mortgage upon part of the 
goods insured, see 8 M1cH. L. Rsv. 67. 
INSURANci;:-No L1ABILI'l'Y uNn1'& Pol.ICY Ex.EMP'l'ING DF.A'l'H Rr:sUI.'l'ING 
FROM "WAR" FOR DROWNING OF INSURED WHEN LuSI'l'ANIA SANK.-Under a 
life insurance policy expressly providing that it did not cover death resulting 
directly or ind'irectly or wholly or partly from war, where the insured was 
a passenger 011 the British steamer Lusitania, which was sunk by torpedoes 
fired from a submarine of the Imperial German government, and which was 
part of its naval force, while a state of war existed and was then being 
waged between that government and the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland, it was held that the insurer was not liable for the drowning of 
the insured. Vanderbilt et al. v. Travelers' Insurance Co. (N. Y., 1920), 184 
N. Y. Supp. 54 
It was the plaintiff's contention that since the transaction violated the 
common usages and acceptances of principles of enlightened nations, termed 
the laws. o.f war, the death of the insured could not be ascribed to the 
excepted condition of the policy. The defendant contended that however 
execrable the act of the defendant may have been it wa!i_ none the less the 
result of war. These opposing contentions made it necessary for the court 
to define the word "war" as used in the policy. The court defined it as 
"every contention by force between two nations under the authority of their 
respective governments," and therefore concluded that the defendant was 
not liable und·er the policy. In the case of Bas v. Tingy, 4 U. S. 37, the same 
definition was given. In the narrower sense, war has been regarded as con-
trolled within absolute law. GRO'l'IUS (D.E JURE B£I.LI AC PACIS PRor.sc. 28, 
and passim) held this view. Phillimore (Volume 3, p. 82) also said: "It is 
regulated by a code as precise and as well understoo'd as that which governs 
the intercourse of states in their pacific relations to each other." But these 
views of modern jurists owe their existence to mutual concessions and are 
mere voluntary relinquishnients of the rights of war. The Rapid, 8 Cranch. 
155. In Bas v. Tingy, stipra, it was said that "Every contention by force 
between two nations in external matters, under authority of their respective 
governments, is not only war but public war. One whole nation is at war 
with another whole nation, and all the members of the nation declaring war 
are authorized to commit hostilities against all the members of the other in 
every place and:· under every circumstance." In Bishop v. Jones and Petty, 
28 Tex. 294. it was held that "the general rule depends upon and grows out 
of the fundamental principle that when the sovereign power of a state declares 
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war against another state, it implies that the whole nation declares war and 
that all the subjects or citi7.ens of one are the enemies of those of the other." 
See also U. S. v. Active, 24 Fed. Cas. 755. Usage and custom prescribing 
restraints imposed for the protection of non-combatants and third persons 
generally is merely "a guide which the sovereign follows or abandons at his 
will. The rule * * * is addressed to the judgment of the sovereign, and 
although it cannot be disregarded by him without obloquy, yet it may be dis-
regarded." Opinion by Chief Justice Marshall in Brown v. U. S., 8 Cranch . 
. no. It appears then from these authorities that, as far as the courts ar.t 
concerned, every authorized act of hostility against the enemy is lawful. 
War is governed by no restraints or limitations which any nation is bound 
to respect in its dealings with the other. This view, in accordance with that 
of the principal case, is maintained by the weight of authority. 
Ntw TRIALs-WHtRr: Juncr: MlsnID.crs H1Msr:LF ON A POINT oF LAW.-
Two defendants were sued for a trespass, and the judge of the county 
court, sitting without a jury, apportioned the damages between them and 
rendered a several judgment against each for the assigned' p~rtion. Being 
convinced tha: this was error in law, the judge granted a new trial. Held 
that while he could grant a new trial for error committed in point of fact, 
he had no authority to do so for error in point of law. Aster v. Barrett & 
Hulme [1920), 3 K. B. ·13. 
The effect of the above decision is to make it impossible for the trial 
court to correct such an error, and to force the aggrieved party to an appeal. 
TQe American practice is generally contra. Hawxhurst v. Rathgeb (18g8); 
n9 Cal. 532; Wilson v. City National Bank (1877), 51 Neb. 87. But it is· 
'said that when the. error fa purely one of law the effect of the award of a 
mew trial is not a re-trial of the case but only a correction of the error by 
the court. Lumbermen!s Ins. Co. v. City of St. Paul (1901), 82 Minn. 497; 
Me"ill v. Miller (1903), 28 Mont. 134- In Indiana the practire is in accord-
ance with the rule stated in the principal case. Holmes·v. Phoenix Mut. Life 
Ins. Co. (1874), 49 Ind. 356; Maynard v. Waidlirh (1901), 156 Ind. 562. 
PAttNTs-Urn.1TY oF !NvtNTION.-Plaintiff sued to recover damages for 
infringement of a patent. It was shown on the trial that the apparatus as 
described in the patent would not work successfully, although it could be 
made to do so by some mechanical changes. Held, the patent was invalid 
because of the inutility of the device. Beidler v. United States (1920), 40 
Sup. Ct. 564-
It was quite unnecessary for the court to pass on the validity of the 
patent. If the defendant was using essentially the same device as that cov-
ered by the patent, then obviously the patented device was usable. "The 
patent was itself evidence of the utility of Claim 4, and the defendant was. 
estopped from denying that it was of value." Westinghouse Co. v. Wagner 
Mfg. Co., 225 U. S. 004, 616. If the defendant was using an essentially dif-
ferent device, equally obviously he was not infringing the plaintiff's patent 
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and the validity of the patent was quite extraneous to the case. In going 
out of its way to invalidate the patent the court disregards several prior 
decisions. In Lowell v. Lewis, I Mason 182, the contention was raised that 
the patent was invalid for lack of utility in the device. Mr. Justice Story 
held, however, "The word 'useful,' therefore, is incorporated into the act in 
contradistinction to mischievous or immoral. * * * But if the invention steers 
wide of these objections, whether it be more or less useful is a circumstance 
very material to the interest of the patentee, but of no importance to the 
public." Acc., Bedford v. Hunt, I Mason 302; Kneass v. Schuylkill Bank, 4 
Wash. 9. In Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Aluminium Stopper Co., 1o8 Fed. 
845, the patentee was allowed to recover damages for infringement even 
though .the device as literally described in his patent would not work at all. 
The decision was placed on the ground that it took mere mechanical skill 
so to change it that it would work, and that the d'efendant, therefore, was 
using a device which embodied the idea covered by the plaintiff's patent. 
Acc •. Br1m.t'lttick-Balke-Collander v. Backus, etc., Co., 153 Fed. 288. The 
principal case cites no authority on the point at all. 
TFL'ECRAPRs-Cou.MJ;Rcr..-A contract, made in the state of Alabama for 
the transmission of a message from one point in the state to another point 
therein, routed by the telegraph company to the point of del~very by way of 
a relay station in the state of Georgia, held, an interstate transaction. West-
ern Union Telegraph Co. v. Glover (Ala., 1920), 86 So. 154-
The Alabama court in its "opinion admits that the trend of authority is 
contrary to its view. fo fact, its holding on this point of interstate com-
merce, it agrees, is not necessary to its decision. Of the numerous cases on 
the subject, it finds but two to cite as favoring its view, and even in one of 
these the statement on the point is plainly obiter. Telegraph Co. v. Taylor, 
57 Ind. App. 93, 104 N. E. 771. At first, misconceiving the doctrine of 
Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Penna., 145 U. S. 192 (involving the taxation of 
intrastate railways passing for a short distance into another state), some 
courts held that if the termini of a telegraph line were in one state a mes-
sage between them was intrastate, even though the line passed in part over 
ithe territory of another state. Railroad Commissioners v. Telegraph Co., 
113 N. C. 213; Telegraph Cq. v. Reynolds, 100 Va. 459. Then came the 
decision in Hanley v. Kansas City So. R. Co., 187 U. S. 617, which restricted 
the doctrine of the Lehigh Valley case, and, in 1910, the amendment by Con-
gress of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 so as to place interstate tele-
grams under the control of Congress on the same footing with the business 
of other common carriers. Most states then turned to the interstate com-
merce view. Telegraph Co. v. Bolling, 120 Va. 413; Telegraph Co. v. Lee, 
174 Ky. 210, Ann. Cas. 1918-C, 1026 and 1036, notes; Klippel v. Telegraph Co. 
(Kan., 1920), 186 Pac. 993; L. R. A. 1918-A, 8o7. The United States Supreme 
Court in a most recent case held contrary to the decision in the principal 
case, even though it was found that the message there was sent out of one 
state into another for the purpose of evading liability under the law of the 
' . 
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former. Telegraph Co. v. Speight (1920), - Sup. Ct. Rep.-. In Watson""'· 
Telegraph Co. (N C., 1019), IOI S. E. 81, the court held that a message like 
that in the instant case was not interstate, where the mode of transmission 
was not the usual and customary one, but was adopted to evade state law!.. 
As a curb on fraud this view may be desirable. As a practical matter we 
must consider facts, not motives. Telegraph Co. v. ~Mahone, 120 Va. 422. 
The fact must be tested by the actual transaction, and the transmission of a 
message through two states is actually interstate commerce. Kirkmeyer v. 
,State of Kansas, 236 U. S. 568, 59 L. Ed. 721. From the beginning state 
courts, jealous of the power of their own commonwealths, have naturally 
leaned towards the intrastate view. While the United States Supreme Court, 
as naturally, is inclined to enlarge the scope of federal authority. The gen· 
eral tendency of the last ten years has been to enlarge federal control in 
these fields. See in this connection 16 MICH. L. Riw. 379. 
/ 
TRIAI.-Cor:acroN OF JuRY RJ>vr:as1nr.:r; ERRoR.-ln a prosecution for viola-
tion of the Prohibition Act, the jury reported that they were unable to agree. 
The court instructed the jurymen. that, should they be unable to arrive at a 
verdict, it would be necessary for the court to discharge them for the remain-
der of the term. On appeal of the defendant from the conviction, it was 
held, that such an instruction made for the purpose of coercing a jury is 
reversible error. People v. Strzempkowski (Mich., 1920), 178 N. W. 771. 
The court may properly urge upon the jury the necessity of their coming 
to a verdict. Pierce v. Reh fuss, 35 Mich. 53; White v. Calder, 35 N. Y. 183. 
As a reason for this necessity, the court may advance the expense to the state 
of a retrial, Kelly et al. v. Doremus et al.; 75 Mich. 147 (but see Railway Co. 
v. Ba .. ber (Tex.), 209 S. 'N. 394, 17 MICH. L. Rz:v. 6o7); or the expense to 
the parties, Pierce v. Rehfuss, supra; or the length of time expended on the 
case at the present trial, ShelJ• v. Shely, 20 Ky. Law Rep. 1021; Knickerbocker 
Ice Co. v. Peim. R. Co., 253 Pa. 54- But it is not proper to coerce the jury 
to arrive at a verdict, either by threatening to keep them without food, Han-
cock v. Elam, 62 Tenn. 33; or suggesting the incompetence of the minority 
of the jury, Twiss v. Lehigh Valley Ry. Co., 6I N. Y. App. Div. 286; or by 
threat to discharge. Penpl,• v. Slrzempkowski, supra. The li~e of demarca-
tion seems to be between. using reasonable means to urge the jury to arrive 
at a verdict, White v. Fulton, 68 Ga. Sil, and threats for the purpose of 
coercing them, Hancock v. Elam, supra. However, it is possible that the 
court, in the principal case, misconceived the anxiety which a jury might have 
on being threatened with discharge for the remainder of the term. 
TRov:r;R AND CoNV:r:RSION-M:EASUR:r: OF DAMAGES FOR CoNvttSION 01' 
Tn.rn:r:R.-Trees were unlawfully, but not willfully, cut, and the cut timber 
converted. Held, the measure of recovery in trover is the value of the tim-
ber at the time and! place of conversion, with interest, with no deductions 
for labor perfo1med upon the timber anterior to the consummation of the con-
version by actual removal. West YcllMu Pine Co. v. Stephens (Fla., 1920), 
86 So. 241. 
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The court here announces the measure of damages in cases of the con-
version of re:ilty as first pronounced in Martin v. Porter, 5 M. & W. 352, 
and followed in Morgan v. Powell, 3 Q. B. 278. This rule, though favored 
in cases where the taking was willful or fraudulent, was held inapplicable 
where the defendant acted inadvertently and in the honest belief that he 
had a right to do what he did. Where the taker acted in good faith, it was 
held more reasonable that the "estimate should be the fair value of the prop-
erty in situ, before severance." lVood v. Morewood, j Q. B. 440, note. This 
distinction between willful and innocent taking was followed in Jegon v. 
Vivia11, L. R 3, Ch. 742, and iii Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co., 5 App. 
Cas. 39. In America, Forsyth v. Wells, 41 Pa. 291, established the doctrine· 
that where the defendant acted in good faith he should be allowed the value 
l)f his labor and the measure of damages should be the value of the property 
bcfor!! the wrongdoing he[!an. 'fhe trend of authority shows that American 
courts have taken note of the injustice and oppression of the rule of Martin 
v. Port~r, supra, and of the principal case, where the taking is not willful, 
but innocent. The strict rule may cause_trespassers to be more careful, yet 
it gives the injured party more than j~st compensation for the injury he has 
suffered, and fails to distinguish between fraud and mere mistake. S2nc-
w1cK, DAMAG2S [9 Ed.], Sec. 503. 
TRusTS-CoNsTRucnvr: TRusTs-CoNVF.YANCE WITH ORAL AG~M2NT TG 
R£0oNV2Y.-S and his mother, the defendant, .owned undivided parts of au 
estate. S conveyed his interest to D to enable her to raise money by mort-
gage, on an cral agreement to reconvey when the mortgage should be paid. 
D sold the property after the death of S, repudiating the oral agreement, 
and P, the wife and heir of S, brings action to enforce a trust by implication, 
arising from the fiduciary relation and the .repudiation. Held, that a trust 
by implication, excepted from the Statute of Frauds, arises. Silvers v. 
Howard et al. (Kan., 1920), 190 Pac. 1. 
The court says that it is going too far to say that, in the absem:e of 
fraud, a trust can be raised wherever it is against equity to retain property, 
but finds "constructive fraud" in the abuse of the fiduciary relation. By the 
weight of authority in America, the parol evidence rule and the statute of 
fraud's form insurmountable objections to enforcing a constructive trust in 
the above situation, or where grantee agrees to hold in trust, Titcomb v. 
Morrill, 10 Allen 15, unless there is dishonest intention at the time of con-
veyance, Patton v. Beecher, 62 Ala. 579; Revel v. Alb2rt, 162 N. W. 595; or 
a special fiduciary relation, Biggins v. Biggins, 133 Ill. 2u; see Bullenkamp 
v. Bullenkamp, 43 N. Y. App. 510. But there should be no difference between 
dishonest intention at the time of conveyance and after conveyance; see 
Gibben v. Taylor, 139 Ind. 573. The constructive trust arises not because of 
the parol agreement but because of the grantee being unjustly enriched 
thereby. The English cases recognize this. Hutchins v. Lee, I Atk. 447; 
Davies v. Otty, 35 Beav. 2o8; Haigh v. Kaye, L. R. 7 Ch. App. 469; Booth. v. 
Turle, L. R. 16 Equity Cas. 182; Peacock v. Nelson, 50 Mo. 256 (semble). 
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California finds 110 difference between dishonest intention at the time of con-
veyance and later. Hillyer v. HJ•nes, 33 Cal. App. 5oCi; Hatcher v. Hat.·her, 
264 Pa. St. 10:, ar.cord. And in a case of confidential relationship, Bradley 
v. Bradl.:s, 165 Cal. 237, the court talks about the grantee taking an uncon-
scionable advantage over the confiding trustor, although in the same case, 
which came up later, 37 Cat. App. 263, the court simply said that the breach 
of the promise is "constructive fraud" where there is a confidential relation, 
thus declaring .in accord with the principal case. Yet, finding "constructive 
fraud" where there is a breach of promise by one in a confidential relation 
is a departure from the logic of the situation. A constructive trust is a 
remedial device to do justice, and has nothing to do with the statute of 
frauds. See Davies v. Otty, supra. One wonders if the American courts 
will not eventually put it squarely on· this ground. See article by G. P. 
Costigan, Jr., 12 Mien. L. ~. 515. 
TRusTS-!NV£STKSNTS-C0RPORAtt STOcKs.-A trustee invested trust 
funds in preferred stock of a private corporation which failed. In an action 
by the beneficiaries against the trustee for losses, held, that he is not liable. 
In re Buhl's Estate (Mich., 1920), 178 N. W. 651. 
This case decides this point for the first time in Michigan. It follows 
the Massachusetts rule, substantially, allowing a trustee to invest in the stock 
of a private corporation if the corporation is one in which a prudent man of 
intelligence in such matters would invest when seeking a permanent invest-
ment, the primary object of which is the preservation of the fund, the obtain-
ing of income being of secondary importance. This rule was laid down in 
dicta in Harvard CC'llege v. Amory, 7 Pick. 446, and is followed in Massa-
chusetts and some other states. Lovell v. Minot, 20 Pick. u6 (notes secured 
by stocks in manufacturing company); Kimball v. Whitney, 233 Mass. 321, 
in which the court upheld investment in certificates of an unincorporated 
holding company; Washington v. Emery, 57 N. C. 32 (administrator.); see 
Dickinson, Appellant, 152 Mass. 184- The opposing rule in the United States 
is the so-called New York rule, which holds that the fiduciary relation neces-
sarily excludes placing funds beyond control of trustee, where they can be 
exposed to the hazard of loss or gain, according to the success of the enter-
prise, in the absence of authority given in the trust instrument; or by statute 
or order of the court c'lntrolling the trust. King v. Talbot, 40 N. Y. 76: 
Worrell's Appeal, 23 Pa. 44 (guardian); Commonwealtli v. McConnell, 226 
Pa. St. 244 (lunatic committee) ; Tucker v. State, 72 Ind. 242 (guardian) ; 
see White v. Sherman, 168 Ill. 589. This is the majority rule. Authority of 
the settlor, however, given in the trust instrument, protects the trustee. 
Willis :v. Braucher, 79 Ohi<;> St. 290. It seems as though the New York 
courts recognize a harshness in the rule. In }.fatter of Hall, 164 N. Y. 1¢, 
where authority was given to invest in real or personal securities as trustees 
should see fit, the court intimates that if they had invested in stocks other 
than those of new and untried companies, they would not have been liable. 
And in In re McDowell,_ 16g N. Y. S. 853, where trustees by the instrument 
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were given discretion, the court intimates that if they had invested: in sea-
rnned securities they would not have been liable. And see In re Tozuer's 
Estate, '?53 P-i. St. 3Qf.. The principal case goes only so far as to allow 
investment in preferred stock, but it would be expected that the court would 
go as far as the Massachusetts court. It would seem that Michigan has fol-
lowed the wiser rule, to apply in the situation where the trustee is without 
specific authority, in this day where funds are many and gilt-edged invest-
ments are few, and where many corporations are as safe a permanent invest:. 
ment as are the orthodox permissible trust investments. See McKINN£Y, 
LIABILITlF.S oF TRuSTJ.;F.S l'OR h:v£STM£NTS; 16 Ann. Cas. 69. 
'fRUSTs-TuusT FUNDS M1NGL1':D WITll FuNDs OF TRusn;r:-P~SUltPTION 
IN CASS OF W1T11DRAW.ALS AND SUBSl!QU£NT D£POS1Ts.-A trustee wrongfully 
mingled trust funds witJl money of his own in his personal bank account. 
Withdrawals reduced the balance to less than the amount of the original trust 
fund. Subsequent deposits by the trustee from his own money left a balance 
greater than the amount of the trust fund. In an action to recover the mQney 
thus wrongfully mingled, held, that even though there was no actual intent 
to make restoration, the trustee's motive in making these deposits is imma-
terial and he must be presumed to have restored the trust fund. Hungerford 
v. Curtis (R. I., 1920), uo Atl. 650. 
\Vhere the trustee has wrongfully mingled his money with trust funds, 
:my withdrawals by him will be presumed to have been made from his own 
money. Thus, so long as a balance remains equal to the amount of the trust 
fund, the claimant can have full satisfaction. · Knatchbull v. Hallett, 13 Ch. 
D. 696; Board of Fire {Ind Water Commissioners v. Wilkenson, u9 Mich. 
655; Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Elliotte, 218 Fed. 56i. If, after making with-
drawals resulting in a balance less than the original trust moneys, the wrong-
doer makes deposits from other sources, such sums cannot be attributed to 
the trust account. Powell v. Mo. & Ark. Land Co., 99 Ark. 553; Covey v. 
Cannon, 104 Ark. 550; Board of Commissioners v. Strawn, 157 Fed. 49; 
Hewitt v. Hayes, 205 Mass. 356; American Can Co. v. Williams, 178 Fed. 42(1. 
Cases holding that such additions must be regarded as a restoration of the 
trust funds will be found to rest, it is believed, on an actual intent of the 
wrongdoer to make restitution, or upon circumstances from which such an 
intent could reasonably be inferred. le/fray v. Towar, 63 N. J. Eq. 530; 
State Savings Bank v. Thompson, 128. Pac .. n20; United National RaJ1k v. 
Weatherby, 70 App. Div. (N. Y.) 279; Its re Northrup, 152 Fed~ 263. At least 
in the face of an intent to the contrary, no court seems to have indulged in 
the presumption that the wrongdoer meant to make restoration. It is sub-
mitted that the holding of the court in the instant case to the effect that the 
actual intent is immaterial is at least misleading. The presump.tion that the 
wrongdoer meant to make reparation may not be a violent one, in view of 
his obvious duty to do so, but at the most it is no more than a presumption 
and cannot stand in the face of evidence. Such is the rule with reference 
to the presumption that the wrongdoer withdraws his own money first. 
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Covey v. Cannon, supra. For an exhaustive treatment of this whole subject, 
see article by Professor Scott on the "Right to Follow Money Wrongfully 
Mingled with Other Money,'' in 2'J HARV. L. R.Ev. 125. See also Scott's CAsits 
ON TRUSTS, pp. 547-548. note. 
WoRKH~N's ColllP£NSAT10N AC'l'--lNJURY .l\R1s1NG Ou'l' oF AND IN CouRsi; 
OF EMPLOYHENT.-An employee loading wagons of straw at a stack sought 
rest in the sh~de of a box car during his leisure period, and fell asleep 
and was fatally injured by the moving of the car. Held, the injury did not 
arise out of or in the course of the employment, within the meaning of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. T.Veis Paper Mill Co. v. Ind1istrial Commis-
sion et al. (Ill., 1920), 12'/ N. E. 732. 
The statutes of most of the states require that in order to recover under 
the Workmen's Compensation Act for an injury received, the injury must 
arise out of and in the course of employment. The difficulty is in the appli-
cation of this rule. The court in the principal case held that in order to 
recover under the act the accident must have resulted from a risk reason-
ably incidental to the employment; and a risk is incidental to the employment 
when it belongs to or is connected with what the employee has to do in ful-
filling his contract of service. In Brown et al. v. Bristol Last Bl£>ck Co. 
( 1920), - Vt. -, 1o8 Atl. 927, the court said: "An injury arises in the 
course of employment when it arises within the period of the employment, 
at a place where the employee may reasonably be, and while he is reason:!bly 
fulfilling the duties of his employment; and an injury arises out of the 
employment when it occurs in the course of it, and as a proximate r('sult of 
it, or when the injury is a natural and necessary incident or consequence of 
the employment, a risk being incidental to the employment when it belongs 
to or is connected with what a workman has to do in filling his contract." 
In Haggard's Case, - Mass.-, 125 N. E. 565, where a city's employee dur-
ing the noon hour sat to eat his lunch on the railroad track, leaning against 
a car, and was injured when the car was kicked, it was held that the injury 
was not in the course of his employment by the city to entipe him to com-
pensation under the Compensation Act; the court saying that plaintiff was 
not in a place in which it was necessary for him to be in the course of his 
work, or in going to or coming from it. The act in which he was engaged 
when injured had no relation to his employment. He chose to go to a dan-
gerous place where he had no business to go, incurring a danger of his own 
choosing and one altogether outside any reasonable exercise of his employ-
ment. In Buvia v. Oscar Daniels Co., 203 Mich. 73, the court said: "An 
injury arises out of the employment within the meaning of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act when there is apparent to the rational mind, upon con-
sideration of all the circumstances, a causal conpection between the condi-
tions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting 
injury." Where an employee voluntarily puts himself in a place of danger, 
where he is not required to go, the employer is in no way responsible for 
resulting injury. Therriault v. England et al., 43 Mont. 376, u6 Pac. 581. 
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Upon the authority of these cases the decision in the principal case is 
undoubtedly correct, and the same conclusion would probably be reached in 
all jurisdictions. It is apparent, upon all the circumstances, that there was 
no causal connection between the conditions under which the work was 
required to be performed and the resulting injury. The agency which pro-
duced the injury was in no way connected with the work performed by the 
employee. It cannot be said that while the employee was lying down to 
rest himself he was doing any service required by his employment, and it is 
impossible to see wherein his work e.'Cposec! him to the danger which resulted 
in his injury. The spot he chose was dangerous. The evidence showed that 
a switch engine came upon the tracks twice daily. It could not have been 
contemplated in the contract of employment that when the employe had an 
interval in which he could rest that he would lie down in such a place.- The 
purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act is not to insure the employee 
against all injuries, but to protect him against a risk of hazard taken to per-
form the master's task. Pace v. Appoonoose County, 184 Ia. 498, 168 N. W. 
91(.. See 17 M1cH. L. R1'V. 28o: 16 MICH. L. Rsv. 179, 462. 
